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Abstract 
This essay focuses on four conditions that influence the level of complexity of money 
laundering in relation to organized crime. We start with the types of crime and forms in which 
proceeds are generated, including the type of payment, the visibility of the crimes to victims 
and/or to the authorities, and the elapsed time interval before financial investigation occurs (if 
it ever does). Second, the amount of individual net profits show differences between criminals 
who have no use for money laundering, those who self-launder, and those who need assistance 
from third party launderers. Third are the offender’s goals and preferences in relation to 
spending and investing crime proceeds. Investments are often (culturally) close to home or 
country of origin, some opt to wield (often local) power but a large part is freely spent on a 
hedonistic lifestyle. Fourth, the expected and actual levels of scrutiny and intervention of the 
anti-money laundering regime play a role in influencing savings and re-investment decisions 
and in some arrests and proceeds confiscation, but overall, there is no clear cause-effect 
relationship. The four conditions can intertwine in numerous ways and have no particular 
sequence. When conditions necessitate or stimulate more complex money laundering schemes, 
this is reflected not only in techniques, but also in the social networks that are developed or 
may be a precondition for those schemes (and a constraint on those organized criminals who 
cannot find an appropriate launderer). Complex cases often depend on the assistance of 
professional money launderers, outsiders to the criminal’s usual social circle and in some 
places, their availability might be a constraint on organized criminals’ expansion. Professional 
money launderers are people who can be contracted, as experts in their field, to solve particular 
financial and/or jurisdictional bottlenecks. Using principal-agency theory, we explain how trust 
is established or tension is resolved between criminal and third party launderer.  
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Money laundering is a varied concept. It can be carried out in myriad ways, ranging from simple 
to complex, with numerous variations in laundering costs, and includes a range of participants, 
from elite professionals to homeless addicts acting as ‘front people’ for business and property 
holdings (Levi and Reuter 2006; Reuter and Kleiman 1986; Caulkins and Reuter 2010). To 
make sense of this diversity, money laundering is commonly explained as a way of hiding the 
proceeds of crime so that the authorities cannot take it back, and so that offenders can use it to 
enjoy a more affluent lifestyle and/or to legitimize themselves (and their assets). 
Hiding money from the authorities is not something new or recent. From the US 
Prohibition era to the 1960s, long before the criminalization of money laundering, Al Capone 
and Meyer Lansky (and doubtless, others) tried to hide their crime proceeds and distanced their 
public assets and wealth from the ‘predicate crimes’ that gave rise to them, to reduce their tax 
payments and criminal liabilities. But especially since the 1980s, when ‘following the money’ 
and restricting criminals’ access to the fruits of their crimes became significant elements of 
international policy aimed at transnational organized crime, hiding the proceeds of crime 
evolved into a continuous cat and mouse game with the authorities. It is therefore fair to assume 
that the more controls over the origins of money that are erected, the greater the need for 
concealment from licit society. But then again, not every criminal goes to the same lengths to 
e.g. set up trusts and offshore companies to obscure the background of their wealth. So what 
drives this difference?  
One obvious explanation is the volume of profits from crime and laundering costs. 
Setting up trusts and using offshore companies is something that needs registration and 
consultancy fees. A professional advisor is often needed as well. Expenditures can quickly run 
in the thousands of euros or dollars that eat into the criminal profit. If the criminal profit was 
small (a relative term) to begin with, such efforts at concealment become pointless and cost-
inefficient. However, it would be wrong to imagine that at a certain financial profit point, every 
criminal of note reaches out to international law firms for offshore financial services e.g. 
morally and now economically bankrupt Panamanian-based law firms such as Mossack 
Fonseca & Co.2 That simply has not been proven in any literature on money laundering. 
Likewise, when comparing criminals involved in organized crime, who supposedly make more 
money than ordinary street criminals, many differences crop up. Most spend large amounts of 
 
2 For more background information on the type of dubious services and clients Mossack Fonseca & Co. 
provided, see https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/. 
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cash on a hedonistic life-style, use a basic loan-back construction in which crime money is 
supposedly ‘lent’ by a close relative, or start a fictitious turnover scheme in which illegal profits 
are comingled with the turnover of a legitimate business. Only a few take the Panamanian route, 
so to speak, and set up complex money laundering schemes. 
This leaves us with a puzzle. We know that organized crime activities are for a large 
part carried out with the goal of making a financial profit. These illicit proceeds in turn 
intertwine with the structures and everyday life of licit society: spending for leisure activities, 
buying or investing in real estate, setting up businesses, and perhaps corrupting the authorities. 
But what are the conditions that influence the level of complexity of money laundering, and to 
a lesser extent its patterns, in relation to organized crime?  
The answer to this question is the topic of this essay. The essay is structured as follows. 
In section I we go deeper into the concept of money laundering. This concept is explained by 
using two different approaches, an economic and a legal one. Both have their pros and cons. In 
section II we construct a conceptual framework of factors that impact the need for, and 
utilization of, money laundering schemes by criminals involved in organized crime. Each factor 
is illustrated with several organized crime examples. Our analytical framework finds its roots 
in crime scripting and situational crime prevention, that is to say, we view certain conditions 
that have a known impact on the incidence and forms of money laundering. In Section III, we 
extend the level of complexity from technical complexity to social complexity by including the 
need for outside help provided by professional money launderers. We conclude our essay with 
a general discussion, which raises some as yet unanswered questions about the impact of 
measures on both laundering and crimes committed by the loosely denotated and still 
controversial concept ‘organized crime’. One final remark: some readers will likely notice that 
most of the literature and examples that we use come from the Global North, especially Europe. 
The reason is that European research on money laundering, compared to other parts of the 
world, has been able to make systematic use of court files or access police investigations in 
regard to organized crime. This makes for a detailed reality that is absent from money 
laundering research that solely focuses on legal aspects, international frameworks, or normative 









The literature on money laundering generally can be divided in two different types of approach, 
i.e. an economic approach and a legal one. Both have their strengths and weaknesses. 
In the economic approach, the focus lies on how the criminal money ends up in the legal 
economy. This is usually explained by the use of a three-stage model that has been promoted 
by US agencies since the 1980s and subsequently integrated into international agencies’ and 
anti-money laundering (AML) training cultures: placement, layering and integration (e.g. Dean, 
Fahsin and Gottschalk 2010; Schott 2003).  
Placement is the introduction of criminal proceeds into the financial system. This can 
be done by e.g. depositing cash or transferring money by money remittance bureaux to foreign 
or domestic bank accounts, thus transforming cash into banked assets. Layering is creating a 
distance between the unlawful origins of the money in order to give it the appearance of 
legitimacy, e.g. by using loan backs (i.e. ‘borrowing’ your own money against the security of 
funds already deposited in a foreign personal or business account), fictitious turnover schemes 
(i.e. comingling illegal profits with the turnover of a legitimate business), front companies, shell 
corporations and other financial constructions. This leads to the final phase, integration, in 
which the disguised criminal proceeds are spent or invested in the legal economy, at home or 
abroad.  Note that for some international offenders, there can be a split national affiliation 
between their country(ies) of residence and their country of origin, so whether investment of 
proceeds is at ‘home or abroad’ is not always self-evident.  
Others have added to this model by e.g. including a preliminary stage that precedes 
placement. This could happen, for instance, when cash is physically smuggled abroad, or 
exchanged for other currencies before it is deposited in the financial system. 
Although the three phase model is widely used, it can also be criticized for several 
shortcomings. We point out five types of ‘flaws’ that sometimes makes the model less of a 
proper fit to reality. 
First, not all three phases need to come into play. When financial fraud, for instance, 
results in the fraudulent transfer of legitimate money into the criminal’s (often nominee or fake 
identity) accounts, the proceeds of crime are already in the financial system. They therefore do 
not need to be ‘placed’ by the offenders. Placement and layering can also be skipped when cash 
is used to directly purchase assets, though if they are purchased in a third party name, this might 
be viewed as layering.  
Second, the model suggests there is a sequential ‘law’ in which criminal money always 
ends up integrated in the legal system. In reality, however, criminal money does not always 
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need to be laundered and integrated (Soudijn 2016). Though organized crime may be primarily 
about generating money, it seems to be taken for granted that many organized criminals were 
not also in business to have a ‘good time’, but rather were all committed to a Protestant ethic 
aim of saving and of integration into respectability. To put it differently, a chaotic lifestyle of 
leisure consumption that revolves around casinos, nightclubs and brothels can all be paid for in 
cash. This is a form of integration, but it is not usually what policy-makers might have in mind, 
and it does not fit the model of threatening the virtue of the licit world of finance and economy. 
Third, the origins of cash (or of crypto currencies) do not matter in the criminal 
underworld in which illicit transactions abound. Especially in an organized crime (and also 
paramilitary) context in which many people have regularly to be paid maintenance ‘wages’, the 
proceeds of crime can directly be used to pay off accomplices or to invest in new criminal 
ventures, such as the financing of a new shipment of cocaine. Van Duyne (2002) refers to an 
‘aquarium economy’, an underground environment in which fishy criminal money keeps 
circling around and never enters the legal system. Besides, criminal cash sometimes gets taken 
out of both the illegal and legal economy altogether. House searches of organized criminals 
occasionally turn up hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars or euros that are 
apparently stashed away for a rainy day behind false walls, hidden floorboards or just in the 
attic and under the bed. We do not know to what extent this hoarding is an artefact of the need 
to avoid real or feared anti-money laundering controls, or whether such offenders would have 
kept the money close even absent any such controls. For example, they might be concerned 
about the need for a quick getaway with their crime proceeds, whether from the authorities or 
from rival criminals. 
A fourth criticism of the three phase model is that it was developed in the early 1980s 
for the fight against drug smuggling, and thereby over-emphasizes the role of cash. At that time, 
principally all drug sales were made in cash, not touching the financial system. However, other 
crimes (like many fraud schemes) or the use of technological financial innovations like crypto 
currencies completely sidestep the use of cash which, anyway, is in decline as a proportion of 
transactions, especially in the Global North (Riccardi and Levi 2018) but also in the Global 
South, with the rise of electronic payments systems and mobile phone banking like the m-Pesa 
in East Africa.3 So too does trade based money laundering (TBML), the process of disguising 
 
3 See also https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45716.pdf. Crypto currencies can only be spent in outlets that will accept 
it, which at the time of writing, is a quite limited range. Crypto currencies are therefore often exchanged for fiat 
currencies or cash in a later stage of the money laundering operation. The proportion of illicit market purchases 
that are laundered in cryptocurrencies is unknown but, though rising, is unlikely to be dominant for some time. 
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and moving value through the use of legitimate trade (in physical goods or in services) 
transactions, often by electronic (formerly paper) manipulation of value (FATF 2006, 2008; 
APG, 2012).4  
Fifth, the model also runs the risk of ‘ingenuity fallacy’ i.e., the situation is imagined to 
be more complex than it really is (Felson and Boba 2010). This is observable when the model 
is explained with the use of complex money laundering cases. Accompanying illustrations 
feature the offices of banks or trust agencies, shares, yachts or private jets based in luxurious 
offshore tax havens. This gives the impression that money laundering is a very complicated 
matter, routinely carried out by professionals from the financial service industry and therefore 
best handled by investigators with a degree in accountancy. In reality, however, most money 
laundering investigations carried out by tax authorities or police investigators are quite 
straightforward and do not necessarily involve financial specialists. We are not arguing that 
these complex cases are fictitious: the issue is that they distort the perception of the 
phenomenon by ignoring the large number of simpler cases. 
A final criticism of the three phase model is that it fails to capture the evolution in the 
workings of AML practices. While the US Presidential Commission on Organized Crime 
(1986) merely recommended pursuit of criminal money “as a powerful lever” to attack their 
somewhat narrow vision of organized crime, without going into any more detail, the 
criminalization of money laundering has since resulted in a global system of similar, 
functionally equivalent legislation and institutions not envisaged in the original analytical 
model, which was aimed at the domestic US financial system.5 This is not a normative criticism, 
but the reshaping of the control process is an object of study in its own right, both for 
criminologists and socio-legal/international relations scholars. 
This leads us to the second approach to money laundering, the legal one. International 
legal standards – whose importance and harmonizing influence have been growing this century, 
 
4 Sometimes, these trades are fictitious, which means that in principle, their existence can be falsified after 
financial and documentary investigation. Given scarce resources, such investigation is unlikely to happen in 
practice unless they are an accompaniment to major frauds. 
5 Functional equivalence is an OECD Anti-Bribery Convention concept which focuses attention on the work that 
rules do rather than on their form: so countries are not required to criminalize corporate responsibility if civil or 
administrative mechanisms exert similar control impacts. Current AML laws are based on the 1988 UN convention 
against the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychoactive substances (the Vienna Convention); the 2000 UN 
Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention); FATF recommendations (2003; 2018); 
and five (and rising) EU Directives commencing in 1991 (e.g. 91/308EC; 2001/97/EC). 
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due to the efforts of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), created in 1989, and corollary 
developments in regions such as the EU - construct money laundering generally as:6 
 
1. The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived 
from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity, for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of 
assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such activity to 
evade the legal consequences of his action. 
2. The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in 
such activity. 
3. The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, 
that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of 
participation in such activity. 
 
In other words, depending on the particularities of the jurisdiction’s legislation, a person is 
guilty of money laundering if he or she knowingly receives, possesses, or uses money (or other 
properties) generated by any criminal activity, or if he or she actually did or even reasonably 
could have suspected the money's criminal origins.7 Furthermore, persons who participate in, 
associate to commit, attempt to commit and aid, abet, facilitate and counsel on money 
laundering matters can also be prosecuted. The offence of laundering does not rely on whether 
or not the actions actually legitimize the funds or were intended to do so.  
After adopting this broad legal outline of money laundering, a global system for a risk-
based approach to money laundering became institutional practice (Halliday, Levi, and Reuter 
2014; Nance 2018). This resulted in ever more standardized scrutiny according to Compliance 
regulations, extensive Customer Due Diligence and Know Your Customer procedures, alertness 
and Enhanced Due Diligence for Politically Exposed Persons (public officials and their 
families, both domestically and elsewhere in the world) and the filing of Suspicious Activity 
 
6 Following S.3(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention and European Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 
on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering 
7 Although some countries debate if the proceeds of foreign tax evasion should also fall under this provision, and 
others such as the UK have legislated to make it so, making due diligence tasks for customers challenging to 
regulated persons and institutions.  
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Reports (SARs, in some jurisdictions called Suspicious Transaction Reports –STRs and in 
Australia, Suspicious Matter Reports).  
The enormous reach of the legal definition – stretching from the transnational 
‘Ndrangheta to burglars putting proceeds of crime into their bank account in their own name - 
makes it unhelpful as a coherent category of activity. It is for this reason we opt to approach 
money laundering from an economic perspective, i.e. how does money derived from organized 
crime activities interact with the legal economy? However, we also put the three-phase model 
aside because of its many drawbacks. Instead, influenced by crime scripts and routine activities 
models (see next paragraph), we keep a careful eye for the conditions that influence the level 
of complexity and patterns of money laundering, in relation to organized crime.  
 
II. Conceptual framework 
We join the framers of the UN Transnational Organised Crime Convention 2000 and national 
legislators in sidestepping the problem of defining organized crime with any serious clarity. In 
our analysis, it may not be relevant whether criminal funds are derived from South American 
cartels smuggling drugs, mafia members extorting business owners, white collar criminals 
committing planned frauds or tax crimes, or major corporations involved with Grand 
Corruption or environmental crimes. All of these sources of crime proceeds can sometimes 
involve committing ‘organized crime’ offences when they are carried out with multiple persons 
over longer periods of time, though the latter crimes are only sometimes undertaken by 
‘organized crime’ groups in the sense of ‘full-time criminal bodies’ conventionally understood 
in media, police and political parlance. Besides, the very considerable rise of fraud – especially 
online fraud - as a mode of crime commission in contemporary societies has muddied the 
classical distinction between organized and white-collar crime. Readers should fit the 
particulars of what they deem organized crime cases into our framework, bearing in mind that 
strong images of respectable business or professional firms can disarm ‘suspiciousness’ of 
transactions and erect conscious or unconscious barriers to police and other investigations. 
Nevertheless, in practice, our examples are taken from activities and personnel that we suspect 
most people would regard as ‘organized crime’.8 
 
8 This is a non-trivial issue. In some countries, the linkages between politics, business and suppliers of criminal 
services are close and ideas about criminals subverting polities require refinement. Current allegations about EU 
countries, whether early members such as Italy, or more recent ones such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Malta and 
Romania illustrate how controversial and empirically contested such constructions of ‘organized crime’ as 
‘outsiders’ can be, even in advanced economies with supposedly equivalent systems of governance. For a 




It is a mistake to associate ‘money laundering’ only with the criminal law risks to 
offenders. Though purchasers of illegal commodities are not victims in the same sense that 
blackmail and fraud victims are, victims of ‘organized crime’ and third parties with legal 
standing (including governments and bodies such as the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative 
(StAR)9) may pursue civil litigation against suspected offenders without needing to overcome 
mutual legal assistance difficulties (including prosecutorial resistance in the home countries of 
kleptocrats), and adjudicated on criteria slightly lower than the criminal burden of proof before 
a criminal court. Taking into account such civil litigation and regulatory risks as well as 
prosecution, laundering needs only to be as sophisticated and complex as the control process 
forces it to be. To allow for this diversity in money laundering needs, we take as our point of 
departure a general crime script and routine activities perspective.  
Crime scripting is a research tool that is used for a detailed, sequential analysis of 
specific and precisely defined crime events or criminal activities. To develop a crime script, the 
crime itself is thoroughly deconstructed and reduced to its individual components or scenes 
(Cornish 1994). Each individual component has its own characteristics, which in turn can 
provide insights into how the crime comes together. Thus, an illegal drugs manufacturer and 
trafficker has to be able to accomplish the stages of obtaining precursor chemicals, make the 
drugs, find markets, transport the goods there, et cetera. These insights are important because 
crime scripting is intended for a hands-on approach to crime. An accurate script makes it 
possible to develop interventions that reduce (or prevent) criminal opportunities or incentives 
(Felson 2004).  
A preventative approach in which crime scripts are used has its history in theories about 
routine activities ‘theory’, problem oriented policing, and situational crime prevention. The 
latter has established a systematic body of work, which shows that crime prevention is achieved 
by keeping motivated offenders away from suitable targets at specific points in time and space 
or by increasing the presence of ‘capable guardians’. For a mental road map, various types of 
crime interventions are arranged across a five-pronged approach: increasing the effort, 
 
al. (2013) calculate very different costs of organized crime in Europe, depending on whether the construct is one 
of Mafia-type groups only, or of this plus the much looser networks that comply with the low threshold of EU 
and UN criteria for organized crime.  This essay does not require the resolution of this issue, but denotation 
issues are difficult to escape. 
9 This is a partnership between the World Bank Group and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime that 
supports international efforts to end safe havens for corrupt funds.  The UK has much-heralded civil 
Unexplained Wealth Orders which enable alleged proceeds of corruption abroad to be frozen and forfeited, but 
there have been only four cases (involving many accounts) from 2018 to end 2019. See 
https://fcpablog.com/2019/11/20/uks-new-freeze-and-seize-powers-upheld-in-moldovan-money-laundering-case/ 
Accessed 12 December 2019, 
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increasing the risks, reducing the rewards, reducing provocation and removing excuses (Felson 
and Clarke 1998; Bullock, Clarke, and Tilley 2010; Tilley, and Sidebottom 2017).  
A straightforward application to organized crime and money laundering, however, turns 
out to be more complicated, especially in relation to guardianship (Von Lampe 2011; Kleemans 
and Soudijn 2017). While the presence of others who might stop the crime and/or report 
offenders has strong discouraging effects on ordinary crimes, in a money laundering context, a 
guardian (e.g. bankers, lawyers and auditors) may be simply a hurdle that must be overcome by 
side-stepping the particular individuals or disarming potential suspicions. Some who we would 
term ‘money guardians’ may be knowingly and willingly corrupt; some may be coerced into 
helping; and others may be innocent. However, even innocent potential guardians in financial 
settings are not primarily on the lookout for signs of misconduct, since their raison d’etre and 
profit lies in serving their clients. Except for customers coming in with large cash-filled bags 
marked ‘swag’, or people known (during the account take-on process required by AML 
regulations) to have modest jobs and backgrounds suddenly transacting in large (for them) sums 
or volumes, it is not often obvious whether requests for service are legitimate or are criminal. 
In those countries that include lawyers and accountants in money laundering reporting 
requirements, even if the professionals are suspicious, some may be concerned primarily about 
whether they will be punished for breaching their duties rather than whether there is reasonable 
suspicion that a crime has been committed by their client or potential client.   
This is not to say that it is impossible to use crime scripts and situational prevention 
techniques in relation to organized crimes. Even organized crimes can be (and need to be) 
reduced into smaller sub-sections. For instance, human trafficking can contain subsections on 
recruitment, travel, housing and accommodation of the victims. Likewise, a crime script of 
synthetic drug trafficking could start early in the chain with the procurement of essential 
precursors needed much later in the production phase (Chiu, Leclerc, and Townsley 2011; 
Vijlbrief 2012).  
This slight detour about crime scripts brings us back to our main point. All crimes for 
economic gain that generate more profit than can be spent or readily stored physically require 
a separate crime script on how the financing of and proceeds of crime are handled. After all, 
the leading (though not the only) motive for carrying out organized crime activities is to make 
a profit that can be used. How such laundering is carried out depends on local circumstances 
and changes from crime to crime, from criminal group to criminal group, and from country to 
country. Writing the generic money laundering crime script therefore is not empirically or 
theoretically defensible (though see Gilmour, 2014 for an attempt). Even so, there are several 
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conditions that affect the level of complexity of money laundering in relation to organized crime 
in the broadest sense. These include: 
 
1. Type of crime, particularly whether primarily cash-generating or generating 
electronic funds; 
2. Revenue, shows differences between criminals who have no use for money 
laundering, those who self-launder, and those who need help with laundering; 
3. Offender’s goals, such as individual needs and preferences in regard to financial or 
other returns from criminal investments; 
4. Anti-money laundering regime, such as expected and actual levels of scrutiny and 
intervention. 
 
1. Type of crime  
The first factor in our framework is what type of crimes the organized crime group is involved 
in. As explained below, different types of crime have different financial aspects, including the 
type of payment, the need to pay people extra-territorially, the visibility of the crimes to victims 
and/or to the authorities, and the elapsed time interval before financial investigation occurs (if 
it ever does). 
Whether criminal proceeds come in cash, in some electronic form (including crypto 
currencies), or perhaps barter changes the approach route to the possible money laundering 
process. When the proceeds are in cash, for example, the average anti-money laundering regime 
will impose some constraints on spending and investment habits. In high-income OECD 
economies, especially in expensive areas, a house, for instance, nowadays is rarely bought with 
cash.10 Criminal cash therefore needs to be converted to electronic form, after which it can be 
transferred.11 Some types of crime generate benefits only in the form of crypto currencies. For 
instance, the trade on the dark web in restricted medicines, drugs, stolen credit cards, or 
ransomware schemes are all paid for with crypto currencies. This has its own advantages in 
 
10 Although exceptions exist. For instance, in the US, in 2015, 53 percent of all Miami-Dade home (and 90 
percent of new home) sales were made with cash- double the national average (McPherson, 2017). In Canada 
large sections of real estate (and luxury cars) in British Columbia and Ontario were purchased for cash. See 
https://www.macleans.ca/economy/realestateeconomy/b-c-s-money-laundering-crisis-goes-national/ (accessed 
28 November 2019). 
11 Although buying a house without any mortgage at all can by itself raise questions. The average home owner 
borrows money from a bank to finance the purchase of real estate, unless they can show or plausibly claim that 
they are buying from the proceeds of a previous sale or an inheritance. European lawyers and notaries would 
normally ask for the source of funds, and be expected to check on what they are told, though they may not all 
investigate with equal diligence or forensic skill.  
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regard to concealment, but also has its own detours to convert into the ownership of our 
hypothetical house (Kruisbergen et al. 2019). Fraud offenses, on the other hand, normally 
generate proceeds of crime that are already in the financial system and are thus more easily 
moved around to finance a purchase, e.g. via a mortgage backed by offshore assets that are 
proceeds of crime, to make the purchase look less suspicious. Long term non-fungible 
investments like houses may have to withstand serious investigation at some stage over lengthy 
periods if they are not to risk confiscation. Rigged bids for public works are even better, in that 
the contracts are paid by the government and thus generate a paper trail that seems above 
suspicion: the non-performance or inferior performance of the contract is not routinely visible, 
especially if quality inspectors are paid off.  
 Different types of crime have differences in their visibility to others as crime. Some 
crimes are completely and clearly illegal from beginning to end (like the trade in child online 
sexual exploitation), though the consumption and production of the images are concealed, 
whereas others take place in grey areas. VAT fraud, for example, usually becomes a crime only 
after the fraudulent filing of incorrect tax returns (unless there is forensic evidence of planning 
before the attempt is completed). Forcing women into prostitution is human trafficking, but 
when the sex work openly takes place in legal brothels or red light districts, customers and 
municipal auditors are not always aware (and may not want to be aware or care) that the labor 
is involuntary. Furthermore, when legal work is partly supplemented by illegal labor, for 
example in high cash flow businesses such as bars and restaurants, it becomes easier to co-
mingle legal and illegal money. As a result, it becomes less clear what part of generated profits 
is legal and which is criminal.  
Another problem is that different jurisdictions can hold different interpretations about 
certain types of ‘crime’.12 Tax crimes (not tax avoidance) constitute a good example. Declaring 
a false tax return results in a financial profit for the fraudster, namely the amount due not paid. 
Because tax evasion is a criminal offense in many jurisdictions, an increasing number of 
 
12 According to the FATF (https://www.fatf-gafi.org/glossary/d-i/) Designated categories of offences means: 
participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering; terrorism, including terrorist financing; trafficking 
in human beings and migrant smuggling; sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children; illicit 
trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; illicit arms trafficking; illicit trafficking in stolen and 
other goods; corruption and bribery; fraud; counterfeiting currency; counterfeiting and piracy of products; 
environmental crime; murder, grievous bodily injury; kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking; robbery or 
theft; smuggling; (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes); tax crimes (related to direct taxes 
and indirect taxes); extortion; forgery; piracy; and insider trading and market manipulation. 
When deciding on the range of offences to be covered as predicate offences under each of the categories listed 
above, each country may decide, in accordance with its domestic law, how it will define those offences and the 
nature of any particular elements of those offences that make them serious offences. 
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countries argue that any willfully unpaid taxes are the proceeds of crime and thereby are equated 
to money laundering. Indeed, the FATF formally includes separately fraud and tax ‘crimes’ on 
direct or indirect taxes in its list of predicate crimes. When unpaid taxes are moved abroad, this 
can become a problem for the prosecution when the receiving country does not consider tax 
evasion a crime and therefore is unwilling to exchange information that is needed to prosecute 
these offenders.13 (Though parallel routine tax information exchange has become more 
common due to political pressure on ‘secrecy havens’.) It can also be difficult for bankers and 
lawyers to form a suspicion as to whether or not the funds that are deposited are the proceeds 
of foreign tax evasion:  a predicate crime in the UK, for example, but not everywhere. 
 Different types of crime also result in differences in the frequency in which criminal 
proceeds are generated. Some crimes generate a continuous flow of daily or monthly illicit 
proceeds, whereas others are one-time events that follow no discernable pattern. Take for 
example the difference between forced prostitution and wholesale cocaine trafficking. A Dutch 
investigation into human trafficking found that prostitutes were forced to earn a daily minimum 
of at least 1,000 euros, six days of the week. Other organized crimes that continuously bring in 
money are loan sharking and protection money. Conversely, a cocaine smuggler who organized 
the shipment of hundreds of kilos of cocaine needed weeks of preparation to arrange fake cargo, 
shipping manifestos, and other paperwork. When all was arranged, he had to wait another 
couple of weeks for the transatlantic freighter to dock in the harbor, offload his cargo, and 
unpack it in a warehouse in order to sell the cocaine for a profit of 3-5,000 euros a kilo. The 
difference between receiving numerous small sums regularly and tens or even hundreds of 
thousands of euros intermittently and irregularly, leads to different money laundering dynamics. 
Small amounts of cash can be co-mingled with say, the daily turnover of a bar. But to launder 
a single large sum of money would need better planning in order not to raise suspicion. Of 
course, the money can also be co-mingled with the turnover of a bar or tattoo/beauty parlor, but 
it would need discipline and much more planning, and one bar or restaurant might not be enough 
to be plausible for the turnover level if investigated by law enforcement.  
 In some countries, drugs trafficking generates vast volumes of cash that need to be 
laundered. According to FinCEN (2005), over $120 million dollars from illicit drug sales in the 
US were smuggled in bulk into Mexico over three years for the Arellano-Felix ‘gang’, which 
 
13 Switzerland considered the fraudulent filing of accounts in Switzerland as a crime, but not the ‘evasion’ of 
taxes without active falsification: since 2016, "serious tax crimes" in both direct and indirect taxation have 
become predicate offences for money laundering. Switzerland defines tax fraud leading to tax evasion of more 
than CHF300,000 in a year as a serious tax crime.  Assisting foreign tax evasion remains legal unless it involves 
forging documents, et cetera.  
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were then brought back into the US by declaring the currency in the name of the currency 
exchange houses in Mexico, therefore concealing the illicit origin of the funds. The currency 
was deposited into US bank accounts held in the name of the currency exchange companies. 
Maybe to make the money trail harder to follow, money from these accounts was wire 
transferred to bank accounts around the world, after which the trail went cold or was not 
publicly pursued. 
 
2. Revenue  
The second factor in our general framework is the amount of revenue organized crime 
generates, and more importantly, the net profit of individual crime members. Both lack 
dependable estimations.  
Revenues are important as a component in a claim to official attention, but they tend to 
receive little attention in claims of effectiveness of controls. While official documents 
concerning money laundering or organized crime often confidently mention the scale of global 
or national money laundering (e.g. according to the UNODC, 2.7% of global GDP) – what van 
Duyne and Levi (2005) term ‘facts by repetition’ - academic experts are more reserved. This 
cautious attitude is not because of mere academic pedantry, but because all methods used to 
estimate the size and scale of the criminal economy and money laundering have serious flaws 
(Reuter 2013; Van Duyne, Harvey, and Gelemerova 2019). Furthermore, just as in the licit 
economy, there is economic inequality and wealth concentration among organized criminals 
(Van Duyne and De Miranda 1999; UNODC 2011). Many have subsistence or immediate 
lifestyle incomes, and others get sums so large that even if they are highly hedonistic, they 
would find it difficult to spend and are forced to save and launder. The extent to which they 
need or want to do so is highly dependent on the position of the individual in the organized 
crime network. In general, the crime boss or leading organizer will make more than key 
personnel (“lieutenants”) or outside experts (professional money launderers), who in turn will 
make more than interchangeable accomplices (couriers and transporters, local ‘enforcers’, 
strawmen). It is therefore likely that organized crime typically shows a highly unequal 
distribution of wealth, but valid numbers are not available. In transnational activities, questions 
are seldom asked about who in which countries takes the predominant share of profits from 
crime.14 
 
14 There is no criminological equivalent of the Gini country inequality measure in economics. 
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Generally, a distinction can be made between persons who have little use for money 
laundering, those who self-launder, and those who need help in doing so (Malm and Bichler 
2013). The first two groups are generally considered very large compared with the third. Levitt 
and Venkatesh (2000) found that most drug dealers who worked at street-level earned just above 
minimum wage and would have been better off economically serving hamburgers at a fast-food 
restaurant. Furthermore, a tell-tale sign was that most foot-soldiers also held (part-time) jobs in 
the legitimate economy. Likewise, as shown by Reuter et al. (1990), approximately two-thirds 
of Washington DC drug dealers reported being legitimately employed at the time of their arrest. 
This suggests that their illegal profits were supplements to licit earnings. Only a few gang 
leaders were able to earn high economic returns (Venkatesh 2008).15 For this reason, global or 
national estimates about (particular) crime revenues are – apart from their methodological errors 
– unsuitable for our framework. Without a sense for the number of participants who share the 
criminal profits, and the apportionment of these profits, it is not clear what meaning or value 
estimates of total sums laundered have, beyond showing that this is a ‘very big problem’.  
Because of lack of dependable statistics on criminal revenue, let alone - net of costs 
including corruption – their aggregate profits, we have to make do with other sources like 
official proceeds of crime confiscation, case studies, and interviews, although none are really 
satisfactory. 
In an ideal administrative world, confiscation of legal assets in criminal cases signal 
what an individual can be proven to have gained in illicit proceeds.16 A database of confiscation 
cases paired to type of offenses could thus inform us of the total illicit amount and the type of 
asset. However, as a Transcrime (Savona, and Riccardi 2015) research project on the portfolio 
of organized crime in Europe showed, this is easier said than done. First, there is a wide range 
of confiscation regimes across different states. Some assets are eligible for confiscation in one 
country, whereas it is impossible to recover the same assets (or data about them) in another. 
Second, most countries do not adequately register confiscation. This makes it impossible to 
produce solid statistical analysis.  
 
15 Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) explained the involvement of street-level dealers as playing the long game, i.e. 
hoping to be able to rise someday to the top and finally earn a large illegal income. But perhaps it sometimes 
reflects simply the fact that criminals are around in their environment, and involvement in crime offers some 
degree of social conformity and a feeling that they are more important than they would otherwise be in the licit 
precariat economy. The Homo Economicus model neglects the pleasure that people derive from crime (Katz, 
1988; Levi, 2008) and also from exercising power and taking risks in licit business. 
16 Though some regimes allow for this to be done on civil burdens of proof, others by reversing the burden of 
proof post-conviction in relation to the sources of income, and others still require in practice the linking of 
confiscated assets to proven crimes. 
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There is also substantial attrition between court orders and confiscation. When  
Kruisbergen, Kleemans, and Kouwenberg (2016) examined 102 Dutch cases in detail, the initial 
public prosecutor’s claims totalled €61,928,210 but this was reduced to €27,463,899 (44 per 
cent) at the end of the court procedure, of which only €11,325,036 (41 per cent, or 18 per cent 
of the original claims) was eventually collected. There are similar findings in Australia and in 
the UK (Chaikin 2018; Goldsmith, Gray, and Smith 2016; Levi 2018; see also Sittlington and 
Harvey 2018). 
 Another way of establishing the amount of revenue and individual net profits, is 
studying individual offenders and their money laundering habits, e.g. by analysing their court 
or police files. However, gaining access to this kind of material can be quite hard, and in some 
countries even impossible. Furthermore, many police investigations lack financial details. The 
reason is that most investigations on crimes that are organized are focused on the predicate 
crimes. Generally, as soon as a shipment of cocaine is intercepted, a protection racket is 
dismantled or human trafficking is stopped and the perpetrators arrested, the investigation is 
considered to be a success. In turn, evidence of the predicate crimes is enough to obtain a 
conviction. Because financial information on money laundering will seldom (depending on the 
country and other evidence available) add substantially to the length of the prison sentence, it 
is simply not needed. Or worse, including charges of money laundering could delay the entire 
prosecution when assets need to be traced abroad via slow international mutual legal assistance 
requests. Conversely, when an investigation starts from a money laundering angle, the predicate 
crimes may not be needed (depending on both law and judicial interpretation). It is rare for the 
two (predicate crime + financial data) to come together.  
 Insights can also be gained by approaching organized crime participants themselves. 
However, the target group (organized criminals who launder money) is difficult to reach. They 
are unlikely to fill in questionnaires or respond en masse to field workers: talking about money 
is much more dangerous than talking about past misdeeds that have been punished already, are 
past their statute of limitation period or are impossible to prove because of lack of evidence. 
Criminal money, and the way it was laundered, however, is almost indefinitely subject to 
confiscation. Talking about riches might also attract unwanted attention from criminal 
predators. That is not to say that it is impossible to carry out interviews about criminal money, 
but generally this will be because of good rapport between subject and researcher and reveal 
little about the overall picture unless the interviewee is a central or nodal figure.  
A notable exception is the Matrix Knowledge Report (2007). Researchers were able to talk 
to 222 drug offenders in UK prison about drug markets and financial profits. It turned out that 
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their money laundering methods were generally not sophisticated. However, the researchers 
note that this may reflect self-selection. “Dealers with more sophisticated money laundering 
approaches may have been reluctant to volunteer” (Matrix Knowledge Group 2007, p. 40). 
(Alternatively, such dealers might more rarely have been caught!) A replication in the 
Netherlands encountered the same problems (Unger et al. 2018). Although the study was much 
smaller (N=25 with a response rate of 56%), the information gleaned was not illuminating. 
Most had hardly any experience with complicated money laundering methods. Tellingly, an 
advocacy group of ex-prisoners did not want to cooperate with the interviewers because talking 
about money was “not done” and fear of confiscation would preclude any meaningful talks. 
Trying to get a university project on board that worked with former tax frauds also led to nothing 
(Unger et al. 2018). Several attempts were made to interview the ex-offenders, but were not 
successful. This led to the conclusion that fear of asset confiscation prevented talks about 
money and spending habits. Interviewing lawyers also led to nothing. They were not ‘inclined’ 
to talk (one would guess in the abstract) about the financial position of their clients. Interviews 
with bank employees also elicited no information. Banks had no legal mandate or permission 
(for fear of criminal liability for ‘tipping off’) to divulge how suspected criminals spent their 
money and their focus - which may have shifted due to changes in public-private cooperation 
in the UK - was largely on cash that criminals tried to put in their accounts. Finally, a focus 
group study by Sittlington (2014) of ex-offenders from Northern Ireland largely confirmed 
other studies’ findings about high spending by offenders and prosecutors going after low-
hanging fruit and being reluctant to prosecute standalone laundering cases. The special 
circumstances of strong paramilitary influences in Ireland differ from those in many other 
countries, though the Irish peace process may have led not so much to less organized crime but 




The third factor in our general framework is what organized criminals seek to accomplish with 
their criminal proceeds. Because interviewing organized criminals about their illegal income 
proved not very fruitful (see section above), we should look at how they spend their money and 
try to infer goals from behavior (see also Fernández Steinko 2012). 
 Several studies show that, like average personal budgets, criminal expenses can be 
sorted in the usual categories, albeit with some over the top spending habits (Van Duyne 2003; 
Matrix Group 2007). There are small daily household expenses for food like groceries, variable 
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payments for utility bills, clothing, hobbies, next to fixed costs like insurance, car leases, rents 
or mortgages, and larger outlays such as buying a new car or a house or setting up a company 
(or for that matter, financing new criminal activities). Some studies (Savona, and Riccardi 2015; 
Van Duyne 2013) have looked at official confiscation records, and describe a plethora of cars, 
motorcycles, boats, houses, jewelry, electronic appliances, fur coats and the incidental antique 
work.17 However it may have been these very items of conspicuous consumption that drew the 
attention of the authorities and financial investigators to the criminals in the first place. 
What criminals seek to accomplish with these expenditures has been less often 
investigated. The goal of some expenses is not hard to deduce. Re-investing in criminal 
endeavors or financing large sums of money in a conflict with other organized groups 
(Krawkowski and Zubiria 2019) is carried out with the objective of generating future profits, 
or even survival. Daily household expenditures are motivated by wanting more comfortable 
living conditions. But lifestyle expenditures, for example, can have complex motives. The 
criminal who dines out every evening, runs up large casino losses and spends large sums on 
gaudy jewelry, might do it to satisfy his personal needs, perhaps fill an emotional void, but 
could also want to project the image of a successful ‘made man’ (BRÅ 2014). Many ordinary 
bourgeois citizens might avoid such a brash person, but in the criminal environment, it can 
deliver the message that here is somebody willing to do extra-legal business and who is 
successful at it. Flashy cars and booking expensive front row tables at public boxing matches 
or private boxes at soccer matches can send the same message.18 
 Another way of examining goals of criminal money is to look at their larger 
expenditures. Such expenditures can indicate longer-term strategies. Take for example a Dutch 
study into 1,196 individual investments of convicted organized crime offenders (Kruisbergen, 
Kleemans, and Kouwenberg 2014). The study distinguished between investments that could 
fall under a standard economic approach and a criminal infiltration approach.  
 
17 The literature about money laundering can sometimes overemphasize the role of antiquities and art. 
Occasionally, a crime boss turns out to be a fond collector of expensive paintings and such like. However, art 
that merely hangs on a wall is not money laundering in an operational sense, though it may count as hiding the 
proceeds of crime in a legal sense. Only when it is bought with the intention to sell it on in the licit economy 
does it serve a money laundering function. Furthermore, it should also be considered that certain types of white 
collar crime offenders (corporate fraudsters, oligarchs or corrupt public officials) move in different social circles 
compared to most drug dealers and pimps. A house decorated with expensive art is part of the former’s image 
(and sometimes even a reflection of their taste), whereas the latter is more likely to be fond of stills from The 
Godfather movie (Van Duyne, Louwe, and Soudijn 2014). Nevertheless, small, high value products are 
appreciated in the event of a need for a quick getaway or forced sale. 
18 We know less about how female organized criminals or launderers behave in equivalent circumstances. 
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The standard economic approach, summarized as ‘profitability’, stresses the similarity 
between organized crime offenders and legal entrepreneurs; both are assumed to make 
investments based on the aspiration for good economic returns. A difference might be that 
criminal investments involve additional costs because they need to circumvent the anti-money 
laundering regime). This might make it more attractive to invest in opportunities with smaller 
returns, but lower risks of detection. This in turn is affected by perceptions of invulnerability to 
official action, which vary over time and place.19 
Investments that fall under the criminal infiltration approach are summarized as ‘power’ 
in that organized criminals seek to gain power or influence in the legal economy. This is also 
one of the risks the FATF warns about. Criminals might use their profits to acquire control over 
segments of the local or even (especially in smaller jurisdictions) national economy through 
strategic investments or bribes. A deep angst about money laundering corrupting the integrity 
of banking and financial services drives much of the anti-money laundering regime, at least 
rhetorically.  
The Dutch study (Kruisbergen, Kleemans, and Kouwenberg 2014) showed that 
investments were often made in real estate, for several reasons. First, criminals need a place to 
live. Second, real estate is generally a safe investment over the long term. Third, prices are not 
always transparent and can thus be used to launder money, supplementing the official price 
with money under the counter. Finally, ownership can often be concealed through the use of 
legal entities. As far as is known, criminals invested on a smaller scale in commercial properties, 
likely in order to facilitate their criminal enterprises. Investments in legal businesses were 
largely in the retail and commercial sectors. About half of these companies were used to support 
‘transit crime’ activities like drug smuggling. This could be in the form of logistical support 
(storage or transport), and legitimizing or concealing criminal activity.  For instance, a cleaning 
company could order chemicals used for the production of synthetic drugs, or a fruit or flowers 
company could order a container from South America in which cocaine was smuggled. 
Fernández Steinko (2012) found similar types of investments in Spain. To the extent that such 
businesses are used for criminal purposes, they are not successful laundering vehicles: though 
 
19 Farfán-Méndez (2019) hypothesizes that drug trafficking organizations with hierarchical structures — 
understood as structures that process information and acquire knowledge—prefer risk-averse methods, whereas 
wheel networks tend to use risk-tolerant procedures for laundering money. However, as the author notes, 
“additional data are needed in order to continue to evaluate the hypothesis” (Farfán-Méndez 2019, p.308), and 
we are somewhat skeptical of the evidence base for this to date. Furthermore, we would like to raise the question 
if money laundering strategies are decided at the level of the whole drug trafficking organization, or of the 
individual leader (and as such reflect his psychological preferences), who co-incidentally may or may not have 
proper access to money laundering advisers. 
20 
 
they may provide decent cover for offending unless investigated intensively. Companies could 
also function as money laundering vehicles, absorbing cash money, hiding ownership or 
providing bogus salaries. A pilot study in Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, and the UK 
on the infiltration of organized crime in legitimate business developed a model to help 
understand the type of business at risk. Risk (or attractiveness) factors include low level of 
technology, small company size, low barriers to entry and weak or developing regulation 
(Savona and Berlusconi 2015).20 Establishing or taking over a legitimate company is also part 
of many fraud related schemes (Berlusconi 2016).  
However, the investments in real estate and commercial properties did not properly fit 
the profitability or power approach. Although real estate generally appreciates in value over the 
long term, hardly any known criminals were building up portfolios in real estate. Properties 
were mostly used in their immediate day-to-day lives and not leased or rented out. The 
investments were also not geared to touch the legal financial world in any significant way or to 
control specific segments of society. This prompted the researchers to come up with another 
theory, the social opportunity structure, a symbiosis of social network theory and opportunities 
theory. Social ties and trust direct a criminal’s opportunities for carrying out criminal business, 
and also apply to their choices for investing the proceeds of crime (also see Van Duyne and 
Levi 2005; BRÅ 2014). Organized criminals whom we know about want to stay close to their 
investments from a physical and social point of view. They invested in their original home 
country or their country of residence, and seldom held financial assets in areas in which they 
were not personally involved. These are styled ‘proximity’ investments (Kruisbergen, 
Kleemans, and Kouwenberg 2014). Savona and Riccardi (2018) mention investments that are 
culturally close to the organized crime group, e.g., bikers investing in tattoo shops. 
That is not to say that profitability or power never come into play, or that proximity 
precludes any use of power. Offenders who are not involved solely in transit crime but focus 
on racketeering could spend more on ‘power’. Organized crime groups in several European 
countries invest in the construction business and allied areas that entail “more capillary 
infiltration of the local political, business and social community” (Savona and Riccardi 2015, 
p. 157).  Sometimes, real investments in property and in the services sector (like ‘security’) 
offer a route to exploiting and extending local power and deter police intervention.21 Ponce 
 
20 A follow-up study developed a more advanced risk model based solely on firms confiscated from Italian 
organized crime from 1983 to 2016 (Savona, and Riccardi 2018). 
21 Sometimes other pressures and social objectives – for example preparing and running a successful Olympic 




(2019) recounts how drug trafficking organizations in Mexico (illegally) finance campaigns of 
politicians. Organized crime in Albania is also reported to invest part of their criminal proceeds 
in the cultivation of politicians (Global Initiative 2018). Many other countries have analogous 
scandals, not all of them as dramatic as Mexico. 
Although the criminal investments in the Dutch studies were relatively small on a 
national level, and were not aimed to take over or monopolize segments of business, the local 
level should also be taken into consideration. Here it was found that some criminals wielded 
(knowingly and unknowingly) some influence. For example, a local municipality was not eager 
to target a certain cannabis grower because the legal side of his commercial business employed 
dozens of people who would otherwise end up on social security (Soudijn and Akse 2012). 
Some criminals sponsored local football clubs, which in turn enabled these clubs to attract better 
players (with extra cash paid under the counter). Better players translated to winning more 
matches and generating more interest in the club. This in turn led to cozy relationships between 
the football club’s managers and sponsors, with representatives from the local government. 
These things can create an aura of power and ‘untouchability’ around the offender and their 
entourage. More generally, a sports club of any kind also offers a relatively ‘safe space’ where 
criminal and licit business can be mixed without looking ‘out of place’ or inherently suspicious. 
Bruinsma, Ceulen, and Spapens (2018) reported that a third of Dutch municipalities 
have encountered ‘philanthropical’ criminals. Case samples showed sponsorship of sports 
clubs, events, and fund-raising activities, and setting up of charities. Some criminals even acted 
as ‘informal mayors’ in their neighborhoods (see also Campana and Varese 2018). Outlaw 
Motorcycle Gangs explicitly used philanthropic activities like visiting children’s hospitals and 
distributing stuffed animals to improve their images (Kuldova 2018). Philanthropic activities 
occur in many other parts of the world, albeit on a larger scale. Pablo Escobar is still locally 
revered because for giving money to the poor and stepping in where the authorities had 
withdrawn (both money and reputation laundering). Italian mafia groups and the Yakuza (and 
some officially designated terrorist groups, for example in Pakistan) have been reported to help 
with relief efforts. These efforts cost little money and need no laundering, but generate immense 
local goodwill, while shaming the national government (Kuldova 2018), thus enhancing the 
 
even been alleged of the ‘failure’ to pursue some London organized criminals prior to the London Olympics 
2012 (Gillard, 2019).   
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comparative legitimacy and ‘collective efficacy’ of the crime group. For white collar criminals 
there are other benefits, such as large tax deductions for charitable contributions.22  
Another mixture of power and proximity sometimes occurs when criminals from ethnic 
minorities establish business or religious societies within their own communities (Soudijn and 
Akse 2012). Sometimes they were able to portray themselves as successful and generous 
businesspeople which led to higher standing within the community or even to dealing with the 
government as a community representative.23 It is unclear to what extent ethnic societies were 
aware of the criminal origins of their affluent members. 
In short, although organized criminals’ motivations may be more varied than a simple 
homo economicus model would predict (notably obtaining social standing), achievement of 
their goals often involves activities that violate money laundering legislation.   
 
4. The anti-money laundering regime 
The final component in our framework is the way in which the anti-money laundering (AML) 
regime is locally carried out. Since 1986, when the US Presidential Commission on Organized 
Crime recommended the pursuit of the criminal money trail, there have been developed a 
plethora of general regulatory and criminal justice measures that try to prevent and deter an 
ever-broadening range of ‘criminals’ from using the financial system to hide the proceeds of 
crimes or (which lie outside the remit of this essay) to finance terrorism or weapons of mass 
destruction. An important driver of the AML regime is the inter-governmental Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF). This task force, which describes itself on its website as a ‘policy-making 
body’, has developed a set of ‘Recommendations’ (originally in 1990, revised in 1996, 2001, 
2003 and 2012) that have become the international standard for combatting money 
laundering.24 
The anti-money laundering regime is in essence one gigantic global and local exercise 
in attempted situational crime prevention, whose attractions to governments include the fact 
that most staffing and expenditure on it falls upon the private sector.25 To use situational crime 
 
22 The struggles over the acceptance or rejection of ‘philanthropic’ offers and past donations by shamed or 
questionable-background wealthy donors to the prestigious arts/culture bodies or almost always elite universities 
is too broad an issue for this essay.   
23 In a different era, mobster Joseph Colombo (1923-1978) established the Italian-American Civil Rights League 
to protest stereotypical depictions of Italians as being members of the mafia. At its height, it had a following of 
over 40,000 people. 
24 https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/  
25 The validity of data on compliance costs are difficult to test, and vary over time and place as a function of 




prevention parlance, the obligation of banks and other sectors to report unusual or suspicious 
transactions aim to ‘increase the effort’ by enhancing the level of surveillance that is applied to 
commercial transactions. The compulsory measures to report all cash deposits, money transfers, 
or payments above a certain financial amount26 fall under ‘increase the effort’. Specifically 
accredited individuals or teams within banks who are allowed to vet certain financial 
transactions and reject or ‘de-risk’ individual or business customers can be called ‘access 
control’ operators. All these measures set rules and require training, and thus by themselves 
‘raise the awareness’ or (up to a point) ‘remove excuses’ of those involved.  
This is what Garland (1996) termed ‘responsibilisation’, the shifting of the burden of 
crime control onto the private sector, though Garland was writing about this in the context of 
mundane crimes. In this instance, reporting entities and those who work for them (e.g. bankers 
and lawyers) are required to identify their customers and to record and report suspicious (or as 
we prefer to think of them, suspected) transactions and all transactions with high-value dealers 
in cash above a legally fixed minimum, on pain of prosecution and/or regulatory sanction.27  
Failing to conduct checks and/or make reports to the national Financial Intelligence Unit 
(FIU) if suspicions have been aroused results sometimes in large fines, especially if rule 
breaking can be shown to be intentional and/or systemic (which aim may not be desired because 
of the collateral damage to the bank or to the banking system collectively).28 To give a few 
examples, Wachovia Bank settled in 2010 for US$160 million to resolve allegations that its 
weak internal controls allowed Mexican cartels to launder millions of dollars’ worth of drug 
proceeds. HSBC Holdings PLC agreed in 2012 to pay US$ 1.9 billion after admitting laundering 
drug money for Mexican and Colombian drug cartels. Citigroup in 2017 agreed to pay US$ 
97.4 million in a settlement deal after admitting to criminal violations by willfully failing to 
 
2018 (https://risk.lexisnexis.com/insights-resources/research/2019-true-cost-of-aml-compliance-study-for-
united-states-and-canada). An earlier study found it to be $28 billion in six countries in Asia 
(https://www.lexisnexis.com/risk/intl/en/resources/research/true-cost-of-aml-compliance-apac-survey-
report.pdf), and another found that in a range of continental European countries, average AML compliance costs 
per financial institution range from US$17.2 million in Switzerland to US$23.9 million in Germany, totaling an 
estimated $83.5 billion in Europe (Lexis-Nexis, 2017). The businesses regulated by the UK Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA, 2018) employ at least 11,000 full-time equivalent staff specifically for money laundering and 
financial crime issues, with a salary bill alone of £650m per year.  These costs do not have to be paid out of 
taxation directly, but they do have to be paid for out of the profits of regulated firms. 
26 This minimum varies between countries.  In Australia, for example, it is zero at the time of writing this essay. 
27 One of the earliest examples are Italian authorities who noticed in the late 1970s that proceeds of bank robberies  
funded the activities of the Brigate Rosse and subsequently required Italian banks to report large cash deposits. 






maintain an effective anti-money-laundering system. Dutch ING Bank accepted and paid a 
settlement for 775 million euros agreed by the Netherlands Public Prosecution Service in 2019 
for not acting properly as a gatekeeper to the financial system. According to the settlement 
agreement, ING had set up their internal compliance system for monitoring transactions in such 
a way that only a limited number of money laundering signals were generated. Australia’s 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) paid the Australian authorities US$ 430 when large 
numbers of organized criminals exploited the failure to link large frequent (53,750 in total) cash 
deposits into the bank’s ‘Intelligent Deposit Machines’ to its AML system. At the end of 2019, 
heavy penalties were threatened for Westpac in Australia for 23 million reporting violations, 
which included some unreported wire transfers in relation to, for example, child sex trafficking 
in the Philippines. Fines should be seen in the context of overall profits and of profits from the 
sorts of activities that were ‘neglected’. However, these heavy nominal fines not only pressurize 
the respective bank to be more compliant, but also aim to send a powerful signal to other banks 
to spend more money on their AML departments. After initial resistance, formal regulatory 
measures have been globally accepted by most sections of the private sector (with the exception 
of the legal profession in some countries, such as Australia, Canada and the USA, which have 
successfully resisted the legal obligation to report suspicions to Financial Intelligence Units) 
and have become part of a ‘transnational legal order’ (Halliday, Levi, and Reuter 2019) which 
aims to universalize controls and create a ‘level playing field’ against organized criminals. 
In addition to manual reports from suspicions developed by staff, an important 
development in flagging ‘suspicious’ (or as Gold and Levi (1994) and Levi & Reuter (2006) 
pointed out, suspected)29 transactions is the use of big data. Banks, for example, automatically 
check each financial transaction with a multitude of algorithms for divergent behaviour. These 
algorithms are often bought from third-party companies. The use of big data seems very well 
suited to counter money laundering. First, an enormous amount of financial data is generated 
by the clients, customers and citizens of private, semi-private and public parties. Just think 
about the number of transactions that banks, money transfer companies, insurers, land/property 
registration Agencies, Chambers of Commerce, and tax authorities, to name a few, process on 
a daily basis.  Second, financial data are relatively straightforward and easy to code and have 
long been digitized. A specific monetary value in a specific time period is transferred or belongs 
(or appears to belong) to a certain person or organization. Third, because financial transactions 
 
29 Because ‘suspicious’ implies that there is something in the transaction that reveals something inherently 




are essential for the functioning of society, great pains have been taken to avoid errors. 
Transactions, therefore, match between different partners or systems, and unique identifiers are 
in place. This makes it relatively easy to combine financial data from different parties, which 
is one of the preconditions of big data. 
Some of the monitoring measures clearly deflect and even perhaps prevent crimes 
altogether, both organized frauds against the banking system and other forms of organized 
crime. Data about this are very seldom available. In the UK, the Nationwide Building Society 
– the largest, with 15 million customers - closes down 12,000 accounts a year, half of them for 
suspected ‘money muling’ activities in which genuine accounts are used to push through 
domestic or foreign proceeds of crime transactions; the mid-sized Santander Bank – with 14 
million accounts - alone closes down some 10,800 UK accounts annually because of suspected 
money muling activity.30 In 2017, in the UK, 1.15 million account-opening attempts 
were rejected for financial crime-related reasons.31  Prima facie, this might suggest that the 
system is quite good at prevention, though one cannot deduce from these data how many (ill-
defined) financial crimes are not prevented from account-opening in the UK (and this 
proportion may be wildly different elsewhere in the world, where such data are not collected or 
are unavailable).  
Garland was identifying a trend in relation to ‘ordinary’ crimes. However, this trend has 
turned out to have been an extraordinarily ambitious attempt to impose these responsibilities 
on a uniform global scale. For instance. In the US, the reporting entities filed more than 3 
million SARs in 2017, against only 150,000 in 1996. In Europe, 1.5 million SARs were filed in 
2017 across the then 28 EU Member States, almost double the number received in 2006. The 
UK, The Netherlands, Italy, Latvia and Poland are the top 5 SAR issuers in Europe. Does this 
mean that the UK is more effective than the Netherlands, or twice as effective as Italy but 
nowhere close to the US? No, clearly not. In all of these countries there have been massive 
money laundering scandals, both connected to organized crime and to other sorts of offender 
like Russian, African, Middle Eastern, or East European oligarchs. Furthermore, it is often not 
possible to deduce what proportion of these SARs related to organized crime, however defined, 
or indeed correctly reported transactions that related to any type of crime. How would we expect 
bankers, lawyers, and high value dealers to know for certain that their clients were (‘organized’) 
 
30 Economic Crime - Anti-money laundering supervision and sanctions implementation, Treasury Select 
Committee HC 2010. Q.692. 
31 Ibid. 
http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Treasury/Economic%20
Crime/Oral/96630.html, Q.695.   
26 
 
criminals or that the transactions were proceeds of crime in general or of particular crimes? The 
system circumvents this by requiring them to have systems in place, not to know for certain! 
Nor do we know the number or proportion of transactions that ‘actually’ related to crimes but 
that were not suspected or that, if suspected, were not reported to the national Financial 
Intelligence Units, or were actually investigated only after being reported to them.32  
There are many gaps in reporting, both legislatively (e.g. lawyers in many jurisdictions 
are not obliged to file their suspicions) and in practice. For instance, two reports on casino 
gambling, real estate, luxury vehicle sales, and horse racing in British Columbia (German 2018, 
2019) show widespread evasion of controls in Canada, which only shortly before had been 
highly praised by FATF for the effectiveness of its controls.33  
In theory, a very stringent AML regime makes it more necessary than a lax one to take 
serious steps to hide the criminal origins of assets. In reality, it depends how the AML regime 
is actually put into practice. Some – arguably most - regimes simply don’t have the manpower 
or resources to go after every indication of money laundering. Hülsse (2008) drew attention to 
‘paper compliance’ that hid the fact that certain types of laundering are not actually targeted. 
For instance, the lack of due diligence requirements by Companies House in the UK, the official 
register of companies and corporations, has been a significant weakness,34 albeit one shared by 
other business registers in the EU and elsewhere. An experimental study in which potential 
intentionally dubious customers approached financial intermediaries around the world by email 
has shown that AML rules are applied less stringently in the UK and, especially, the US, 
compared with more stigmatized ‘secrecy havens’ such as the British Virgin Islands and Belize, 
at least to approaches from strangers (Findley, Nielson, and Sharman 2014).  To the extent that 
this is true in practice, it may reflect the differential external pressure that such jurisdictions are 
under to comply with procedures, including the role of FATF as a political instrument of the 
Great Powers. A case in point is the race to the bottom spearheaded by financial secrecy and 
 
32 Europol (2017) states that just 10 percent of suspicious activity reports are further investigated after collection, 
a figure that is unchanged since 2006. However even if one accepts that figure is accurate, it understates 
somewhat the potential value of the data contained in these reports, irrespective of whether or not further 
investigations are triggered. It also raises questions about the value of FIUs demanding an ever-increasing 
number of SARs from professionals, whose lack of follow up is sometimes deflected by FIU complaints about 
their low quality: see NCA (2019). 
33 See also Amicelle and Iafolla, 2018 for some insights into financial services sector perspectives there and 
elsewhere. 
34 See TI UK (2017) and NCA (2018: 38). BEIS (2019) has made some reform proposals in a public consultation 
aimed at improving levels of vigilance at Companies House and the companies’ register. Time will tell whether 
any post-consultation changes have significant impact. 
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trust laws in South-Dakota and Delaware.35 Money in a South-Dakotan trust fund is almost 
impossible to reach by the authorities because of its protected secrecy status. Furthermore, 
while well over a hundred  countries in the world signed up to the global agreement “Common 
Reporting Standard” - an agreement put in place in order to exchange information on the assets 
of each other’s citizens abroad - the US ‘failed’ to do so.  
How an AML regime is put into practice is also dependent on the level of corruption. 
Effective monitoring is thereby dependent on the weakest link. Corrupting a ‘guardian’ of the 
financial system (e.g. a bank employee) helps the criminal to circumvent the very measures that 
the guardian is meant to enforce. Perceptions of corruption can also be important for example 
in deterring people from making SARs if they think that clients will get to hear about them from 
the authorities by leaks, whether in developed or less developed economies. This applies both 
to wealthy elites, who are (or should be, if identified correctly) categorized by regulations as 
Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs), and to other organized criminals, who may be suspected 
of having strong connections to the authorities. In kleptocratic regimes, including some post-
Soviet ones but also Mafia-influenced countries such as Italy, the concentration of influence 
and power shapes both law enforcement and business opportunities such as the award of 
government contracts. 
Too much corruption, however, can be unsafe for criminal investments in the long run 
(Unger, Rawlings et al. 2006; Unger, Ferwerda et al., 2018). Corrupt regimes are unstable and 
unreliable, and are therefore not safe to trust. The more money an organized criminal (or corrupt 
bureaucrat) has to lose, the more important it is to get at least a significant amount of it out of 
the country into financial safe havens.  
Initiatives that rank AML effectiveness per country quickly fall short when the data are 
scrutinized. For instance, the FATF uses a complex system of called ‘Mutual Evaluation 
Reports’ (MERs). The MERs are a kind of lengthy peer reviews of member states on the level 
of compliance with its numerous Recommendations which, since 2013, have included both 
technical compliance and an attempt at effectiveness judgments. However, as Van Duyne, 
Harvey, and Gelemerova (2019) noticed, some MERs report the number of investigations, 
others cases solved, or only the number of prosecutions; terms have no fixed meaning; statistical 
management was seriously lacking in many countries; and there is little or no disclosure (and 






domestic AML regime. This makes cross-country comparison not feasible, and even assessment 
for many single countries hard. Nevertheless, countries are ranked according to four scores, 
ranging from Compliant, Largely Compliant, Partially Compliant, or Non-Compliant. Although 
these scores are more subjective than based on statistical processing of data, countries that score 
especially badly can suffer economic sanctions (also see Halliday, Levi, and Reuter 2014; Platt 
2015; Sharman 2011). After criticism in 2013 of putting too much emphasis on measuring 
formal legislative and institutional arrangements, the FATF sought to update the MER process 
but is still struggling in working out what data and measures are both relevant and possible 
(Levi, Reuter, and Halliday 2018). Indeed in late 2019, just prior to its planned visit to Australia, 
the FATF suspended its follow-up process pending a review of the MER process as a whole. 
Another attempt to measure the risk of money laundering around the world is the AML 
Index that is published by the Basel Institute of Governance. The ranking is based on 14 
indicators that include amongst others the aforementioned MERs, the Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index and press freedom (Basel 2018). Notwithstanding 
glaring weaknesses like Companies House checks on registrations, the Index gives the UK a 
good score, and places it above for example the United States, Germany or Japan. But then 
again, according to this index Dominica, Latvia, and Bulgaria score even better. Here we can 
see the impact of giving equal weight to a country’s MER. Some countries were arguably very 
strictly evaluated by teams from the International Monetary Fund, while others are evaluated 
less critically (though perhaps with more procedural legitimacy) by their neighboring countries 
(Halliday, Levi, and Reuter 2014). There is ongoing debate about the appropriate role in 
National Risk Assessments or MERs of local ‘knowledge’ (or beliefs) in assessing risks, e.g. in 
informal communities in Africa. 
 
 
III. Professional money launderers and the supply of money laundering services 
Whereas there are reams of articles about the legal and technical components of the AML 
compliance process, and an increasing amount of material on the international relations 
components thereof (since FATF has been a successful policy entrepreneur), sociological 
analysis of the cultures in which compliance operates has been weaker, and (like regulatory and 
criminal justice action) has focused largely on the banking and money remittance systems. 
Investigative journalism and NGO activism have yielded considerable insights into ‘high end’ 
relations between Global North bankers, oligarchs and corrupt politicians (Bullough, 2018; 
Enrich, 2017; Obermayer and Obermaier, 2017; Posner, 2015; Shaxson, 2012) and -however 
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hard to test their veracity36 - financial sector memoirs add some insights to this (Birkenfeld, 
2016; Kimelman, 2017). But ‘organized crime’ in the conventional sense cannot be read off so 
simply from these accounts because it is not clear whether the ‘labeling process’ makes banker 
and lawyer treatment of ‘organized crime’ funds different and plausibly more rigorous, whether 
from morality or pragmatism in defending themselves personally and the institution against 
large fines, prosecution and/or reputational damage. Others have studied the role of ‘creative 
compliance’ in the interaction between tax evasion and tax planning (‘whiter than white-collar 
crime’) (McBarnet and Whelan, 1991). But how professionals nowadays respond to drugs and 
human traffickers bearing cash is less well understood, other than via iconic cases such as 
HSBC and other exposed banking violations that lie outside conventional criminological 
discourses.   
In other words, we now know more about major corporate misconduct cases and their 
links to culture from sociological and media studies of the financial crisis (e.g. Luyendijk, 2015; 
Tett, 2010) than we do about the demi-monde or the Underworld aspects of laundering.  This is 
important because routine activities models require their setting in ordinary interactions and, 
except via the aggregating efforts of nodal laundering entrepreneurs who may forge unusual 
links to permit a step change in criminal capabilities, elite City commercial law firms and 
bankers are as remote from these routines as they are from High Street law firms, local retail 
banks and Money Service Businesses.  
But although we know little about the supply side of money laundering services (besides 
the criminal and regulatory cases, media expose cases, and the mystery shopping research), 
generally speaking, there is variability amongst offenders in the need for laundering services, 
as well as the different resources that different sorts of offenders bring to the table to enable 
them to dispose of that proportion of illicit income that they wish to conserve (Horgby, 
Särnqvist, and Korsell 2015). Some criminals have the necessary expertise to launder their own 
illegal profits, whether they be ‘small’ or ‘large’. This is called self-laundering. It is difficult to 
delineate where the particular financial thresholds lie at which a person decides to self-launder 
or not (also see the section on revenue and individual profits). It depends on the factors we 
determined in our conceptual framework (the type of crime, the amount involved, offender’s 
goals and the AML-regime). Criminals who are able to come up with complicated fraud 
 
36 Some cultural criminologists might not accept the relevance or importance of testing veracity, but though a 
perspective does not have to be shared by others or be ‘accurate’ to be genuinely held, even those who believe 
that ‘offender accounts’ are important ought to worry about verification problems for ‘facts’ about offending.  
This a much broader philosophical dispute, for which this is not the right place. 
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schemes are likely to be able to self-launder their criminal profits, even if these are quite 
substantial. Criminals who derive their income from directing drug sales in the street will 
probably find themselves at a loss when it comes to setting up a complicated international 
company structure. But as we have seen in the previous section, the need for money laundering 
also depends on the goals to which the criminal money is intended and the rigor of the anti-
money laundering regime. If a criminal only wants to buy a new gold chain at the local jeweler, 
a simple story of the money being his birthday present might be enough. On the other hand, if 
he wanted to buy a new yacht, a better story (and a justificatory if false paper trail) is probably 
needed. But then again, had the offender lived in a region without an adequate anti-money 
laundering regime (or corrupted/intimidated a private or public sector guardian), a story 
wouldn’t be needed at all.  
If self-laundering is not an option, the laundering can be outsourced to so-called 
facilitators, also known as financial enablers or professional money launderers (PMLs). These 
are people who, as experts in their field, are contracted by the criminal to solve particular 
financial bottlenecks (Kleemans, Brienen, and Van de Bunt 2002; Kruisbergen, Van de Bunt, 
and Kleemans 2012). A PML is thus not just anyone who assists in the commission of the crime 
of ML, but somebody who delivers a service that is essential if the offenders want to be able to 
develop crimes at scale. This is an important distinction from so-called ‘front men’ or ‘straw 
men’. Such people are useful in many a money laundering scheme, but they are merely 
signatories to property deeds, vehicle registrations, or company documents. They have no say 
in the planning or execution of the money laundering scheme itself. In contrast to PMLs, they 
are easily replaceable. Some front people are random addicts recruited on the street, in prison 
or seedy bars who earn a couple of hundred euros at the utmost. Others are found closer to 
home, i.e. friends, ‘significant others’ and family members (sometimes allegedly placed as 
nominal business or property owners without their knowledge).37 Sometimes - knowingly, 
unknowingly or willfully blind - students or even fraud victims are recruited personally or via 
social media as ‘money mules’ to run financial transfers through their legitimately opened bank 
accounts.38 They are sometimes told lies about acting for marketing firms or trouble opening 
new accounts.    
 
37 A study of confiscated firms that belonged to Italian mafia-type organized crime groups showed that female 
ownership was about 50% higher than the national average (Savona and Riccardi 2018). Using spouses and girl 
friends as straw women has the advantage of providing them with a seemingly legitimate income (Soudijn 2010). 
38 https://www.cifas.org.uk/newsroom/new-data-reveals-stark-increase-young-people-acting-money-mules; 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/over-1500-money-mules-identified-in-worldwide-money-
laundering-sting; https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-45797603 (all accessed 30 June 2019). 
31 
 
How often PMLs come into play is not clear and depends on local circumstances. Some 
studies estimate quite low numbers. Analyzing 52 Dutch money laundering convictions 
involving over 450,000 euro, Van Duyne (2003) only found 2 cases (3.8%) in which PMLs 
were involved. Based on an analysis of 129 Canadian organized crime networks during 2004-
2006, Malm and Bichler (2013) estimated that only 8% of the drug-market launderers could be 
classified as PMLs. Reuter and Truman (2004) found that 16% of people in prison for 
laundering drug money had no other drug involvement. Other estimates are unsupported. 
Though there is no reason why the proportion of PMLs should be all similar over time and 
place, such differences may be attributable in part to the way police investigations are carried 
out (Soudijn 2016). That in itself is influenced by the extent to which money laundering is 
prioritized (or not) by the judicial authorities, and their experiences (or not) in prosecuting 
ambitious and sometimes costly cases when budgets are constrained, either encouraging or 
discouraging them from similar cases. Van Duyne’s low figure can be partly explained by his 
inclusion of a time period in which anti-money laundering legislation was not yet even in place 
in the Netherlands. Another factor influencing money laundering investigations are the 
existence (or not) of self-laundering offences. In some jurisdictions self-laundering is not a 
prosecutable offence, which means that criminals themselves are usually targeted through 
‘traditional’ criminal association offences (and related investigation tools).  
Even when money laundering legislation is in place, PMLs can still be overlooked 
during police, customs or other law enforcement investigations. This often happens when the 
focus solely lies on predicate crimes such as large-scale drug smuggling. Considerable efforts 
are dedicated to intercept or confiscate the smuggled drugs, and when this goal is reached, the 
case is often deemed a success and closed. In about half of the cases in a Dutch study of 31 case 
files on large-scale cocaine smugglers (smuggling hundreds of kilos of cocaine on average), 
one or more PMLs were involved (Soudijn 2014). This high score not coincidentally could be 
traced back to about half of the cases in which the investigators had also been actively looking 
for PMLs and had dedicated resources to this goal from the earliest planning stages of the 
investigation. Levi and Osofsky (1995) noted that in the UK, financial investigators were often 
brought in at the tail end of investigations for asset recovery rather than being mainstreamed, 
and that is often still the case (Levi 2018). It is therefore likely that the percentage of PMLs in 
non-fraud organized crime activities that generate large-scale profits (over 350,000 euro) could 
be closer to 100%. Forensically, if PMLs are harder to convict, their relative absence in 







PMLs can be classified in different ways. Malm and Bichler (2013) point out that there is a 
difference between PMLs who serve multiple criminal clients, and (in their terms) opportunistic 
launderers who only launder for one person exclusively. This last category often has a 
relationship based on friendship or kinship, e.g. a close friend, a spouse or a cousin. From a 
disruption perspective, little is known about how difficult it is to replace a PML if one is taken 
out, either by enforcement, retirement, or assassination. 
Another way to classify PMLs is to look at their profession. Several studies mention 
lawyers, accountants, notaries, real estate agents, and even stockbrokers as PMLs (Malm and 
Bichler 2013). In other words, PMLs are mostly active in professions that require some 
qualifications, or at least have their own professional status. Middleton and Levi (2005, 2015) 
discuss mainly lawyers who launder the proceeds of their own crimes such as fraud, but also 
those who launder the proceeds of other people’s crimes, after mutual attraction through vice 
and/or blackmail pressure. They also note the way in which changes in ethical legal culture, 
financial pressures from commercial deterioration, and the ownership of law firms may increase 
money laundering opportunities and ‘needs’. Benson (2018, 2020) analyzed 20 cases between 
2002-2013 in which lawyers or accountants were convicted of money laundering. The cases 
demonstrated considerable variation in the actions and behaviours of lawyers that can be 
considered to facilitate money laundering, and for which professionals can be convicted 
under the money laundering legislation. These variations related to the purpose of the 
transactions involved, the level of financial benefit gained by the professional, and the 
nature of their relationship with the predicate offender. For example, while acting in the 
purchase or sale of residential property and moving money through their firm’s client 
account were the most common means by which lawyers in the cases were involved with 
criminal funds, the cases also included lawyers who had: written to a bank to try to get 
them to unfreeze  an account; paid bail for a client using what was considered to be the 
proceeds of crime; transferred ownership of hotels belonging to a client; written a series of 
profit and loss figures on the back of a letter; and witnessed an email, allowed the use of 
headed stationery and provided legal advice for a mortgage fraudster. Four lawyers were 
knowingly and intentionally involved, but in the majority of cases, there was no evidence 
of a deliberate decision to offend or dishonesty on the part of the lawyer. Money laundering 
‘enablers’, therefore, are not a homogenous phenomenon and we should distinguish between 
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professional money laundering and laundering by people with professional status. The 
culpability of the latter set is heavily disputed by their professional bodies, who regard the 
term ‘professional enablers’ as a derogatory term to discredit the legitimacy of both their 
profession and of their arguments against regulation (first author interviews in the UK, 
2016-2019).39  
Not all PMLs are regulated or qualified professionals. There are several reasons for this. 
First, several PMLs use loose terms like tax adviser, or financial consultant that need no formal 
financial training or regulatory permit to practice. Secondly, some PMLs originally had a 
background as a lawyer or notary, but have been expelled because of fraudulent activities or 
suchlike. Therefore, they can no longer act as licensed lawyers or notaries, but continue to 
advise criminals how to launder their financial gains, even though some of their activities might 
require signing off by licensed professionals, who may or may not be knowing parties to the 
crimes. Third, a group of PMLs have carved a financial niche by wiring or physically smuggling 
large amounts of cash through banking networks (‘underground’, as they held no permit 
whatsoever), although greater attention to transaction volumes of customers and the ‘de-
risking’ (i.e. account closing) of many of them may have inhibited such efforts over time.  
A differentiation can also be made between PMLs whose activities are cash based and 
circumvent the legal economy, those who create a (false) paper trail in the legal economy, and 
those who solely focus on crypto currencies (Soudijn 2019). This latter category provides 
outlets for exchanging fiat currencies into new, virtual coins or vice versa. Exchanging crypto 
currencies by itself is not a criminal offense; however, by deliberately targeting conspicuous 
clients (and charging a premium compared to normal exchangers), they become part of a money 
laundering scheme. Or rather, they become the money launderer. The premium price charged, 
if proven to the satisfaction of the court, can be evidence that they knew that the proceeds were 
illicit. 
Because financial investigations in the Netherlands of large-scale cocaine smuggling 
groups often involved underground bankers, more and more knowledge has been gained about 
this subgroup. It became apparent that this type of PML were largely structured along ethnic 
lines (Soudijn 2016). Criminal cash that virtually traveled across corresponding accounts often 
were found in specific Indian, Pakistani, and Afghani networks. Collectively they are known as 
hawala networks (Maimbo 2003; Jost and Sandhu 2003).40 Bulk cash smuggling was organized 
 
39 Google and other web platforms who take money for advertising fraudulent companies are also ‘enablers’ 
according to the same logic. 
40 The term hawala has Arabic roots and means exchange. For more linguistic detail, see e.g. Martin (2009). 
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around Colombian, Mexican, Venezuelan, Chinese, Lebanese and Israeli networks.41 In other 
parts of the world, underground banking is mentioned e.g. in relation to Somalian, Vietnamese 
or Tamil communities, although it is less clear in what way they transport money from 
organized crime (El Qorchi, Maimbo, and Wilson 2003; Hernandez-Coss 2005; Cheran and 
Aiken 2005).  
Although the structure of each underground banking group had a clear ethnic 
background, it was observed that they worked together when it was to their advantage, and they 
did not discriminate against clients from other nationalities. The underground bankers in the 
Dutch study not only transferred money, but also functioned as escrow accounts, exchanged 
smaller for larger dominations (or vice versa), changed currencies and even held criminal 
savings.42  
General classification of PMLs can also take place according to the activities or services 
they actually carry out. The FATF (2018) mentions a number of such specialized services: 
consulting and advising; registering and maintaining companies or other legal entities; serving 
as nominees for companies and accounts; providing false documentation; comingling legal and 
illegal proceeds; placing and moving illicit cash; purchasing assets; obtaining financing; 
identifying investment opportunities; indirectly purchasing and holding assets; orchestrating 
lawsuits; and recruiting and managing money mules. This ‘script analysis’ does not tell us about 
which actors play multiple or single roles. 
Another way to look at the services provided by PMLs is to focus on their specific roles. 
The FATF (2018) distinguishes 8 specific roles, although this list should not be considered 
exhaustive: Leading and controlling; Introducing and promoting; Maintaining infrastructure 
(e.g. a money mule herder, a person who oversees the deployment of the people who are hired 
only to transfer or smuggle illicit money); Managing documents; Managing transportation; 
Investing or purchasing assets; Collecting illicit funds; and Transmitting funds. The FATF 
(2018) remarks that PMLs can perform more than one role. The feasibility of using these roles 
for research or analysis has not been tested, however. 
 
Criminal careers of PMLs 
 
41 Although these networks can also use virtual smuggling networks. For example, the NCA (2019) reports about 
a form of Chinese underground banking called 'daigou', that partly makes use of Chinese student accounts. 
42 Passas (1999; 2003) coined the term “Informal Value Transfer Systems” (IVTS) as an alternative to underground 
banking to emphasize that they did not provide other services than the transfer of money. In hindsight, the term 
IVTS itself is too narrow, as some underground bankers did and do carry out more activities than informally 




It is a common law enforcement trope that some close-knit organized groups, e.g. those 
structured on religion or race, send younger relatives to study law or accountancy who 
subsequently become employed by the criminal family as money launderers. But this requires 
a longevity of vision and commitment to long-term criminality that may be uncommon. It may 
take many years before a lawyer or accountant is in a position to help an organized crime group 
significantly, and their supervision arrangements within a firm may inhibit the scale of their 
assistance. 
Although little research has been devoted specifically to PMLs, life course research 
shows that criminal facilitators in general frequently seem to move into organized crime late in 
their career, by way of ‘lateral entry’ (Kleemans and De Poot 2008). That is to say, they come 
into contact with crime at a later stage in their lives. As such, their ‘adult onset’ does not 
conform to the stereotypical age-crime curve observed elsewhere in criminological research 
(see also Kleemans and Van Koppen in this volume). This curve describes first a rise in 
offending during adolescence, followed by a strong and steady decline over the rest of their life 
course. PMLs are also different from life-course persistent offenders, in that they did not start 
out with antisocial behavior from an early age and remained criminally active later in life. On 
the contrary, criminal facilitators are generally found to have become criminally active only in 
their thirties, forties, or later. At that stage of life, they skip the petty crime convictions that 
make up the typical age-crime career, but right away build up a criminal record in relation to 
organized crime offenses. 
 One difference between early and late onset is that the usual offender has a somewhat 
limited low self-control due to his young age, and the types of crime that are typically registered 
in their criminal records are open to anyone. Petty crime, rowdy behavior and other sorts of 
public nuisance don’t need specific skills and planning to commit. Organized crime offenses, 
on the other hand, are not open to anyone but require the necessary contacts (both licit and 
illicit), trust, and skills (Kleemans and De Poot 2008). That is not to say that the typical 
organized crime offender is a late starter. Some are born in the ‘right’ kind of family and 
therefore learn by doing at an early age. But for criminal facilitators, including PMLs, this is 
generally not the case. Through social ties they generally became involved in organized crime 
activities at later stages in life, albeit by different paths. The connection often happened by 
chance. Living in the same neighborhood, having mutual friends, encounters in the work place, 
or enjoying the same hobbies and vices led to meetings across different walks of life that 
wouldn’t have happened otherwise. Life events were another type of chance that stood out in 
particular. These events are life-changing occurrences, often related to financial setbacks like 
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becoming bankrupt or losing a job. For instance, a financial setback prompted one person to 
seek out a money lender, and thus became entangled with the criminal underworld. Another 
person with gambling debts heard through his social circle about a grey market for currency 
trading, and asked to become involved as well. A normally crime-inhibiting life event like 
marriage can lead to crime when somebody happened to marry in a criminal family and 
subsequently became involved in his father-in-law’s illegal business. 
One caveat about the late onset of PMLs is that such a conclusion is based on research 
in relation to (Dutch) transit oriented organized crime. It is not automatically applicable to 
countries with other types of organized crime (and subsequently other amounts of revenue, 
other goals of crime money, and other anti-money laundering regimes).  
 
 
The principal-agency problem 
As we have seen in previous sections, the financial proceeds of organized crime can be entrusted 
to a PML to launder when needed. Criminal and launderer come into contact with each other 
because of a criminal’s deliberate search or a chance encounter (for example at sporting or vice 
venues). This launches the PML’s criminal career later in life. But what remains puzzling is the 
question of trust. How do criminals trust a literal outsider (and perhaps one with financial 
problems that tempt them into offering criminal services) to do a proper job and not to defraud 
or betray them? How are potential conflicts and tensions resolved? 
This type of problem can be approached from the perspective of ‘principal-agency 
theory’ as developed in the business and management literature (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Eisenhardt 1989; Kiser 1999; Ross 1976). The ‘principal’ is the party that wants somebody to 
do a job on their behalf and the ‘agent’ is the party that is contracted. In the case of money 
laundering, the criminal who needs his money laundered would be called the principal, and the 
PML the agent.43  
 Principal-agency theory tries to find solutions to real and potential conflicts that arise 
from transactional arrangements, the so-called agency problems. There are two types of agency 
problems. The first type of conflict occurs when the agent and principal goals and interests 
diverge.  
 
43 Money laundering agency problems are usually placed in the licit economy. For example, the FIU or a 
regulator is the principal and banks who should file SARs become the agents (Araujo 2010; Takáts 2011). 
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The second type of agency problem occurs when the principal finds it difficult or 
expensive to verify if the agent is behaving appropriately (Eisenhardt 1989). In the specific case 
of money laundering, this has a circular logic to it. The PML gets hired because of the criminal’s 
lack of money laundering expertise. But how then can the principal be sure that the PML is 
doing an adequate job? Agents might also misrepresent their abilities. Having imperfect 
knowledge of the action of an agent is called information asymmetry. 
Furthermore, in the case of money laundering (or any criminal business), there are other 
challenges that are not found in legitimate businesses. For example, the absence of a legal 
contract enforcement mechanism, the risk of interference from law enforcement, and actual as 
well as potential violence from competitors or the principal against the agent. All of these 
transactional uncertainties and risk factors increase the potential for disputes and conflicts. To 
counter agency problems, various mechanisms can be devised to align the interests of the agent 
with those of the principal. These also fall into two general categories: monitoring and the use 
of (dis)incentives. 
 With monitoring, the principal tries to close the gap of any information asymmetry. A 
complete closure would mean following the agent every step of the way, but that would cost 
enormous time and energy. Moreover, when two or more agents are involved, such close 
monitoring becomes logistically impossible. In the legal business world, the principal must rely 
on such techniques as the filing of reports, the standardization of tasks, and the use of 
supervisors. In the illegal business world, such solutions are hardly feasible because they leave 
paper trails. Therefore, a more commonly observed way in the illegal business world to solve 
the agency problem are the use of financial incentives and physical disincentives. Financial 
incentives can be quite substantial. For instance, a study on the physical smuggling of money 
made from high volume cocaine trafficking, using business records of the smugglers 
themselves, showed that it cost between 10% and 17% to transport the money from Europe to 
South-America (Soudijn and Reuter 2016), considerably more expensive than the 2-4% 
identified in earlier US work for crossing the Mexican border (see also Farfán-Méndez, 2019). 
For instance, a Colombian underground banker who received one million euros in the 
Netherlands could charge 12% and thus ‘only’ needed to deliver 880,000 euro somewhere else. 
But it was also noted that the high prices of the smuggling agents were also partly ‘insurance’. 
If the money was somehow intercepted or lost, the principal was guaranteed delivery at the 
expense of the agent. Another example of financial incentives can be found in the exchange 
rates of bitcoins stemming from criminal activities. Less scrupulous exchangers who exchanged 
bitcoins for cash (or vice versa), offered their services for 7-15% to criminals, way above going 
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market rates of 0.25-0.30% (Visser 2017). Given the risks of fraud by those running bitcoin 
exchanges, this could have been insurance as well as a technological skills premium. 
 Agents are further kept in line by disincentives like cuts, fines or the threat (and use) of 
violence. Although money laundering is not usually connected to violence, there are more than 
enough examples of violent outcomes. Whereas Meyer Lansky lived to the age of 81, others 
were not so lucky. In 1982 the corrupt banker Roberto Calvi, also called God’s Banker because 
of his close ties to the Vatican and role in its Banco Ambrosiano, was found hanging under a 
bridge in London, with bricks in his pockets, attributed initially by the City of London police 
to suicide. No doubt coincidentally, his secretary Grazielle Corracher, fell out of a window to 
her death on the same day. According to public prosecutors in Rome, Calvi was punished by 
the mafia for substantial losses when his bank went under. Based on a Dutch report about money 
laundering, it estimated that one PML a year is killed, and more are wounded (Soudijn, 2017). 
This is a high number for a country with a very low homicide rate. Although violence 
surrounding money laundering is rare compared to the violence surrounding narcotics 
trafficking, the stakes are just as high. Or even higher still. When money is lost or badly 
managed, the predicate crimes have been all for nothing. Patience and understanding can also 
run short, and may generate further violence or criminal inefficiencies linked to loss of trust 
and friendship (if any). When criminal money is successfully laundered and invested in real 
estate, it is no longer immediately available. This is not always appreciated (with sometimes 
fatal results) by criminals who become cash-strapped or simply mistrustful. When PMLs are 
killed (or die from natural causes or accidents), there may be genuine problems for survivors 
and principals in gaining access to the funds and knowing what belongs to whom in mixed 
assets. Furthermore, ‘latterly’ entering the world of money laundering also brings its own 
dangers. People lacking the kind of street smarts most organized criminals possess sometimes 
become victims of their new environment. They can fall prey to intimidation and when word 
gets out that they are handling large amounts of cash, they can become the target of 
extortion/robberies by rival criminal groups.  
 
 
IV. Discussion  
We set out in this essay to determine the conditions that influence the level of complexity of 
money laundering in relation to organized crime. This immediately posed the difficulty of 
defining money laundering. It was resolved pragmatically by focusing not on a (country-
variable) legal definition of money laundering but on an economic one, i.e. how does money 
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derived from organized crime activities interact with the legal economy. That is not to say that 
legal definitions are an unimportant object of study. A legal angle can reflect the changes in the 
politics of law making and monitoring, or the constraints they pose (or do not pose) to criminal, 
civil and administrative justice. Evolving legislation has significant effects on mutual legal 
assistance (MLA) and extradition because of this (in EU terminology) ‘approximation’ of laws 
and regulation, and though the number of incoming and outgoing MLA requests are usually set 
out in the Mutual Evaluation Reports (as they are a performance indicator for cooperation), 
their importance in bringing offenders to justice or in reducing organized crime remains under-
analyzed, despite the rhetorical use of the term ‘effectiveness’.  
Another difficulty for this paper was how to differentiate the laundering of organized 
crime funds from other sources of criminal income, which include tax evasion, grand corruption 
and the financing of terrorism – all of which can often involve committing ‘organized crime’ 
offences or at least offenses that are highly ‘organized’. In the end we decided to follow the 
traditional framework of organized crime; criminal activities carried out with multiple persons 
over longer periods of time, rather than focusing on corporations who commit crimes to raise 
their sales or profits in the context of otherwise lawful activities, or kleptocrats who may 
receive/extort bribes from overseas corporations as well as from domestic sources. This reflects 
no judgment about the relative harms of those criminal activities (about which the first author 
has written elsewhere), but simply retains consistency with the ‘organized crime’ theme. 
In our framework we distinguished four important factors (type of crime, revenue, goals, 
and AML-regime) that influence the level of complexity of money laundering in relation to 
organized crime. The sequence is of no great importance, because the four conditions can 
intertwine in numerous ways. For instance, large illicit proceeds are easier to launder, and hence 
less complex, when the AML-regime has limited coverage or is corruptible. These proceeds of 
crime might even come about because of corruption, which makes it easier to defraud the state 
or international bodies such as the EU or overseas aid agencies, or can be re-invested in the 
political process where the whole or part of the goal is development of ‘power’.  
 Depending on the circumstances of the four factors put forward in our framework, 
money laundering can be carried out in more or less complex methods. Recognizing that this 
needs further specification, we would suggest 4 categories: no need for laundering, and 
laundering methods of low, medium and high complexity. Each level carries several 
implications for official response. 
In the first category, money laundering methods are not needed. For instance, criminal 
money can be spent in cash in the legal economy without ultimately drawing attention and 
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repercussions of the authorities. There are differences in such circumstances across countries. 
Country A might e.g. have lower thresholds in place for buying goods for cash compared to 
country B. Consequently, investigating such cases should not be too difficult, and could be 
handled by any local police unit, provided that there are adequate anti-money laundering laws 
in place. 
In the second category, only low levels of complexity are needed. Again, the 
circumstances can vary per country. For instance, drug traffickers in South America and human 
trafficking gangs in Europe might both have a very low levels of laundering complexity. But 
whereas the former can circumvent anti-money laundering regimes because of corruption of 
banking and criminal justice, the latter may not make enough money to necessitate the evasion 
of AML rules beyond cross-border smuggling, and can go about just purchasing property in 
their countries of origin that do not scrutinize rigorously the origins of funds for such purposes. 
Investigating low levels of complexity again should not tax investigative powers too highly 
(although corruption is a bit of a risk). 
In the third category, money laundering becomes harder to detect. The laundering 
scheme will not be obvious at first glance, but will still collapse quickly if more critically 
examined. For instance, a drug trafficker can co-mingle illegal proceeds in the daily turnover 
of an auto repair shop or a restaurant or beauty parlor, but if almost no customers ever show up, 
it is not a very robust scheme if investigated competently and reasonably promptly. 
Finally, there are laundering operations in place that are highly complex and therefore 
need dedicated investigative teams and accountants that e.g. can detect the ultimate beneficial 
ownership of holdings and trusts. Such cases are often related with fraud offenses, but could 
also be the legacy of having overlooked financial assets of organized crime figures in previous 
years or even generations. Another aspect of these complex cases is that professional money 
launderers can play a role. 
Studies reveal no obvious pattern to what criminals do with the proceeds of crime, even 
once they have indulged their varied hedonistic appetites. We continue to think that each 
individual offender or network/crime group begins with its own capabilities to launder, and 
some of them actively or adventitiously search for co-offenders who can help them launder, 
whether voluntarily or as part of an extortive relationship. Some of these succeed; others fail.  
We do not know how hard it is to find another professional launderer, but we find it plausible 
that it is not extremely hard in most countries. In jurisdictions where offenders have cynical 
views about the morality of bankers, and lawyers, they will be more inclined to ask them to 
help, especially if the professionals are from ‘their’ communities, are known to have vices or 
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financial weaknesses, and may be more amenable to pressure and temptation which may take 
place after ‘grooming’ over time. In jurisdictions where such professionals are ethically 
schooled and have reporting requirements that are significantly policed, and where there are 
relatively few economic pressures, one would expect most such requests to be turned down, if 
made. Such ‘differential association’ models are difficult to test, and the data are too weak and 
anecdotal to enable general inferences to be made. There is no reason why the involvement of 
professionals in money laundering should be constant over place and time:  to that extent, 
universal statements are likely to be over-generalizations. 
It is possible that law enforcement professionals’ efforts (and their resources) have not 
been strong enough, including the reluctance of enforcement agencies to shift their patterns of 
intelligence development and interventions in the direction recommended by FATF and ‘follow 
the money’ advocates. This will be an ongoing debate. General trends in the anonymization of 
money – the decline of cash (for example in jurisdictions like Sweden) and the rise of 
cryptocurrencies – will affect the attractiveness of some crimes and the ease of laundering.  But 
scepticism should be exercised about the ‘hype’ that surrounds some of these trends, which 
need to be related in detail to the forms of crime. Even though cryptocurrencies have 
undoubtedly become more popular as a sales medium and laundering mechanism, their 
proportion of proceeds or profits from crimes not perpetrated on the Internet is likely to be 
modest for some years to come. 
Perhaps it is too ambitious to aim to impact on all organized crime rather than on 
particular communities, crime organizations or on particular forms of criminal activity. This 
weight of satisficing public expectations can easily descend into populist policing – one of the 
concerns of libertarians and scholars who object to ‘Policing for Profit’ (Baumer 2008; 
Carpenter et al. 2015; Holcomb et al. 2018; Worrall and Kovandzic 2008) – and brush aside 
both the economic and social costs of AML, which are less visible to the public and to 
politicians. The visible face of anti-money laundering is egregious failures of bank reporting of 
transactions connected to drugs, human or endangered wildlife trafficking; the successes are 
very seldom trumpeted, to protect the reporting bodies and people. But AML and proceeds of 
crime freezing and confiscation are ways of showing that something is being done to stop at 
least some offenders from enjoying the fruits of their crimes, and that is a non-trivial social 
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